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The purpose of this paper is to present the economic analysis and research on invasive 
species management, which implies, in principle, a focus on two main questions: (i) how 
to set targets for species damage mitigation? and (ii) which policy instruments are best in 
achieving the target(s)? The results indicated that a majority of the studies recognize the 
need for addressing the links between economic and ecological systems and accounting 
for the uncertainty associated with predicting damages from invasive species. A common 
result is that strategies for prevention, control and damage reduction are complementary, 
and neglect of any of them may lead to unnecessary large social costs. Furthermore, unless 
economy-wide adjustments are accounted for when designing tariffs on imports, counter-
active results may occur where the risk of invasive species damage increases. However, 
due to insufficient availability of data on the environmental impacts of alien invasive spe-
cies, there is a lack of empirical applications.
Introduction
Alien species are not a new phenomenon, but 
can be traced back to the arrival of agriculture 
10 000 years ago, which also implied the arrival 
of pests. Scientists have documented a number 
of alien and invasive species with detrimental 
effects. One example is the impact of signal 
crayfish on endemic noble crayfish in Sweden 
(Kataria 2007). Another example is provided by 
the degradation of assets, such as power plants 
and water treatment facilities, caused by the 
zebra mussels in the Great Lakes (e.g. Pimentel 
et al. 2001).
However, in spite of ecologists’ and biolo-
gists’ relatively early recognition and concern 
about environmental damages and social costs 
associated with invasive species, the environ-
mental economics research on this topic is scant 
(e.g. Perrings et al. 2000). The main part of the 
economics research has been focused on ex ante 
and ex post assessment of costs of invasive spe-
cies or on cost and benefit calculations of pro-
grammes preventing, controlling or eradicating 
damages from species invasion (see reviews in 
Rockwell 2003, Stutzman et al. 2004, Born et al. 
2005, Olson 2006). Rockwell (2003) and Lovell 
et al. (2006) reviewed studies on damage costs 
of aquatic alien species, Olson (2006) contains 
a corresponding survey for terrestrial alien spe-
cies, and Stutzman et al. (2004) and Born et al. 
(2005) provide surveys of studies on damage 
and mitigation costs of alien species in general. 
The purpose of this paper is to extend on these 
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surveys by reviewing the economics of manage-
ment of alien species causing or expected to 
cause damages in the host regions, denoted as 
alien invasive species. Alien Invasive Species, 
or AIS for short, “means an alien species which 
becomes established in natural or semi-natural 
ecosystems or habitat, is an agent of change, 
and threatens native biological diversity” (IUCN 
2000). However, a limitation is made by the 
exclusion of the relatively large literature on pest 
management, and on economics of infectious 
disease control in humans and animals.
In principle, the need for management of 
alien invasive species arises from its public 
good characteristics. This means that many may 
suffer from damages caused by alien invasive 
species escaping from one or several possible 
transport paths. Correspondingly, costly actions 
undertaken by one or a few firms will create 
beneficial changes from reductions in the prob-
ability of damages from alien invasive species 
for several others. Due to this asymmetry in 
costs and benefits from control, public interven-
tion is needed. Economics of AIS management 
then deals with two main issues. One is the 
identification and quantification of targets for 
projects aimed at applying prevention, control 
and/or eradication measures at the best use of 
society’s total resources. The other issue is how 
to choose the best policies for implementing the 
chosen targets.
The review in this paper shows that the vast 
majority of studies on economics of alien-spe-
cies management focus on two main issues: 
efficient management for target setting, i.e. when 
expected net benefits for society are maximized, 
and choices of trade policies for preventing spe-
cies from entering a host region. The choice of 
target setting is determined by costs of measures 
and expected impacts of the AIS at one or sev-
eral of the stages in the alien species invasion 
chain: introduction, establishment, spread and 
damage creation. Prevention measures, such as 
inspection of vessels, aim at reducing the risk 
of the entrance of AIS in a host region, and con-
trol measures, such as harvesting of an invasive 
aquatic weed, refer to controlling the spread and 
damage of an AIS within a region. The literature 
recommends prevention measures when costs 
of monitoring and inspecting all entrance points 
are relatively low and the expected damage and 
growth in the population of the prevented alien 
species is high, but suggests control measures 
when these conditions do not hold. A relative 
advantage of control measures is that they are 
directed towards sure invasions. Rapid response 
to a detected alien species can be justified when 
there is relatively much information on the risks 
of the spread and damage of the species. Other-
wise, investment in bioeconomic data for obtain-
ing more information on spread and damage of 
the species can be a better strategy than imple-
menting costly measures for combating poten-
tially harmless alien species.
Once the target has been determined for one 
or several of the invasion stages, policies for 
affecting peoples’ behaviour need to be imple-
mented. A majority of the studies on policies 
for alien species management focus on tariffs 
and inspection of imported goods for preventing 
species entrance. They do, however, arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions depending on assumptions of 
economy-wide adjustments to changes in trade 
policies and of causes of damages of alien spe-
cies in a host country. Although it seems as if tar-
iffs and inspection policies would reduce imports 
and associated risk of AIS introduction, damages 
from AIS may in fact increase as a result of a 
tariff introduction due to changes in land use. 
Therefore, policies directed towards control of 
AIS within a country, such as a suggested system 
for trading risks in AIS, can be preferred to 
tariff policies. However, the potential of national 
policies to combat invasive species have been 
analysed in relatively few studies. There are also 
few studies calculating and predicting economic 
and environmental impacts of alternative meas-
ures and policies, which is due to the difficulty of 
obtaining data of sufficient quality. The difficulty 
specific to alien invasive species is to obtain data 
of good quality on environmental impacts of 
invasive species.
This paper is organized along the two main 
issues on AIS management, i.e. on determining 
targets and choosing policies. The first chapter 
then presents research on setting targets with 
respect to invasive species and the second chapter 
presents studies on policy instruments suggested 
for combating invasive species. Each chapter 
gives a brief economic theoretical background 
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and then presents associated research. Although 
the theoretical illustrations presented for each of 
the two research fields may seem unrealistically 
simple, they are of practical use since they give 
guidance to choice of strategies and data needs. 
The paper ends with a concluding chapter.
How to determine targets for AIS 
management?
Not every alien needs immediate actions, and 
economic analyses of costs and benefits from dif-
ferent measures against alien species can there-
fore be a useful tool for policy makers. This 
implies the comparison of costs and benefits, and 
choice of ambition level, or target, for manage-
ment strategies, i.e. the first question raised in 
economics of policy analysis. The main principles 
for choosing the ‘right’ ambition levels are quite 
straightforward, but, as will be demonstrated in 
this chapter, the associated empirical applications 
are difficult to make due to lack of data.
In economics, the guiding principle for 
choosing the ‘right’ ambition level for combating 
the damages of an alien invasive species (AIS) is 
determined by maximizing total benefits minus 
costs of measures against damages of AIS (Fig. 
1). Figure 1 is a strongly simplified and stylized 
presentation, but can be useful for structuring 
information and data needs.
The total benefit (TB) curve illustrates a 
common feature of declining benefits of further 
AIS population reduction, which implies that 
increases in benefits from additional reductions 
in a certain AIS population become smaller, the 
higher the reduction level. For example, for a 
biodiversity threatening AIS, the risk of threat is 
likely to increase with the AIS population size. 
Benefits from a certain AIS reduction, as meas-
ured by decreases in threat to biodiversity, are 
then likely to be higher for higher AIS population 
levels than for lower ones. The TC curve shows 
the allocation of different prevention and control 
measures, such as port inspections and creation 
of barriers, which minimizes total costs for each 
reduction in the population. Equivalently, the 
curve shows the minimum financial resources 
needed for achieving each reduction level. The 
minimum financial resources needed for achiev-
ing the optimal population reduction level where 
net benefits are maximised correspond to TC*, 
which can be paid by public bodies as compen-
sation payments to firms bearing the cost of the 
measures and/or by the firms undertaking the 
reduction measures. At N°, TC exceeds TB and 
population reductions at this or higher levels 
cause net losses for society and should therefore 
not be undertaken. Note that all reduction levels 
below N° generate net benefits for society, but 
N* gives the largest net benefit.
The main purpose of most economic stud-
ies is to find policies and measures that reach 
the optimum level of N*. There are several 
studies estimating costs and benefits of specific 
measures, such as biological control: see e.g. 
Born et al. (2005) and Lovell et al. (2006) for 
reviews. However, although useful, such cost 
benefit analysis can result in acceptance of any 
programme generating population reductions 
between N´ and N° (Fig. 1). The best use of 
society’s total resources occurs only at N* since 
at this level, society obtains the greatest net 
benefits. Therefore, the identification and charac-
terization of such an efficient management level 
are of main concern for most economic studies. 
It is then recognized that the simple, but illustra-
tive, Fig. 1 hides several factors complicating 










Fig. 1. illustration of efficient ais population reduction. 
the curves tc and tB indicate total costs and total 
benefits measured in monetary terms (euro), from ais 
population reductions. n´ = no ais reduction; n* = ais 
reduction which gives the maximum net social benefits 
as tB* – tc*. n° = ais reduction when tB and tc are 
equal
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encompassing several policy intervention stages 
between introduction pathways and final possi-
ble damages in a region, is illustrated in Fig. 2.
In principle, we can distinguish between 
three main stages for target setting and policy 
intervention: introduction, establishment and 
spread, and damages. Introduction can occur at 
several entrance points, such as harbour ports, 
and the risk of introduction increases as the 
number of ports increases. Each single port has 
to inspect several vessels, and, as pointed out by 
Perrings et al. (2002), the probability of entrance 
of an AIS is highly dependent on the weakest 
link, for example a port with the least stringent 
inspections of vessels. Measures aimed at reduc-
ing the risk of AIS entrance into a region, such 
as inspection at ports, are denoted prevention 
measures. If a species is successful in invading 
a region, the next stage in the chain is to control 
establishment and spread, which is dependent on 
several physical and biological characteristics 
of the region. Examples of control measures are 
containment, biocontrol, use of chemicals and 
harvesting of the invasive species.
By definition, an invasive species creates 
damages, which constitute the third stage in Fig. 
2. Damages from AIS are defined as changes 
in total net welfare in society caused by an 
alien species. Quantification of such a change 
is obtained in two steps: (i) identification and 
quantification of all effects, and (ii) assessment 
of the effects in monetary terms. The first step 
requires information on the impact of the alien 
species in humans and on the ecosystem in situ, 
so-called direct impacts, and on surrounding 
ecosystems and dispersal of effects in the entire 
economy, denoted as indirect impacts (Fig. 2). 
Direct effects refer to those occurring directly 
as a result of the AIS, in an ecosystem such as 
timber losses in forests, or on human health by, 
for example, rat bites. Biodiversity changes may 
also occur in the ecosystem where the AIS enters. 
Indirect effects occur from the responses of the 
ecosystems and humans to the direct changes. 
For example, decreases in harvests of crops or 
cattle production may affect the food sectors in 
the economy. Economy-wide adjustments then 
take place, which result in price increases, which 
affect consumers negatively. For an export-
ing country, incomes from international sales 
decrease. Indirect effects can also occur through 
the spread of impacts on surrounding ecosys-
tems. For example, an invaded wetland may 
adjust by reducing its cleaning capacity of pol-
lutants, which affect downstream ecosystems. 
This may, in turn, give rise to further dispersal of 
direct and indirect effects through, for example, 
decreases in fish harvest from a coastal zone 
which, in turn, affect the fishery sector.
In identifying optimal management, it is not 
enough just to identify the three policy interven-
tion stages (Fig. 2), but also to understand their 
AIS in a specific ecosystem








Losses in harvests and changes in prices of marketed products
such as fish, timber and crops, and non-marketed impacts on
health, biodiversity, and ecosystem regulatory functions such as







Fig. 2. illustration of three 
ais policy stages in a host 
region.
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dynamics and complexity at each stage. For 
example, how can the risk associated with each 
of these stages be described in time and space? 
This has been recognized in most studies aimed 
at identifying efficient management strategies. A 
common feature of these studies is that they are 
theoretical with no, or only illustrative, empiri-
cal applications due to the difficulty of obtaining 
data on each of the three levels (see Fig. 2). This 
is one reason why a few studies instead focus 
on cost-effective allocation of different preven-
tion and control measures, where total costs are 
minimized for different predetermined targets of, 
for example, AIS spread or damage reduction. 
Another category of studies analyses the impact 
on efficient management from insufficient infor-
mation on the introduction and spread of AIS, 
and our limited ability to understand small prob-
abilities for an AIS to pass all the stages in the 
invasion chain, which, if successful, can cause 
large damages.
Studies on efficient AIS management
A vast majority of the studies on economics of 
alien species management aim at identifying 
the optimal management level (N* in Fig. 1), 
while considering one or several of the stages 
presented in Fig. 2, and including mainly direct 
effects. A conceptual model for linking eco-
logical and economic systems for management 
purposes is provided by Mumford (2002). In the 
economics literature on efficient management 
the main focus is on how to make trade-offs 
between net costs of prevention and control 
strategies (see Fig. 2) (e.g. Settle and Shogren 
2002, Perrings et al. 2002, Olson and Roy 2005, 
Perrings 2005, Finnof et al. 2005, Finnof et 
al. 2007). While prevention measures allow for 
relatively low costs of preventing an identified 
species from entering a host region, relatively 
much resources may be spent on implementation 
of measures, such as inspection of vessels, at all 
possible entrance points. The prevention cost of 
each identified species may then be relatively 
large, which can be justified if the costs of con-
trolling the species once it has entered the region 
are relatively large and/or if the damage costs of 
the invasive species in the host region are high. 
The relative advantage of control and adaptation 
measures is that they are directed towards sure 
invasions or damage (e.g. Finoff 2007). On the 
other hand, associated control costs can be large 
because of the difficulty of reducing the size and 
spread of the population. However, since com-
plete eradication is usually costly it can be justi-
fied on efficiency grounds only for a relatively 
small population size of invasive species when 
the growth rate of the species population is high, 
and marginal benefits from avoided damages are 
more likely to exceed marginal cost of the con-
trol measure (Olson and Roy 2002).
Closely related to choice of strategy with 
respect to prevention or control targets is the 
choice of timing of implementation of measures. 
For example, a rapid response to a detected 
alien species in a host region may reduce costs 
of spread and damage as compared with those 
of delayed control (Settle and Shogren 2002, 
Saphores and Shogren 2005, Finnoff et al. 2007, 
Keller et al. 2007). In principle, there are two 
balancing factors with respect to the timing of 
implementation of measures. Delays in control 
postpone expenses, which then are reduced in 
present terms when the discount rate is positive. 
Furthermore, since the damage of the detected 
alien species is unknown there is a risk of using 
scarce resources on mitigating a harmless alien 
species. On the other hand, the risk of irrevers-
ible damage from potentially harmful species 
increases with time. The relative magnitude of 
these counteracting forces is, however, much 
determined by the choice of discount rate and 
knowledge of the detected species. Settle and 
Shogren (2002) point at the role of hyperbolic 
discounting (where the discount rate is reduced 
over time) as compared with a constant rate, 
which is used in most studies and in practice. 
Since a hyperbolic discount rate does not dis-
count future net benefits as quickly as a constant 
discount rate, present value of net utility streams 
are higher, which favours relatively early actions. 
Knowledge of potential damage by an alien spe-
cies can be obtained from investment in collec-
tion and analysis of bioeconomic data, which, in 
turn, can improve the precision of rapid response 
and reduce costs of mitigating harmless alien 
species (Saphores and Shogren 2005, Keller et 
al. 2007).
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However, there are few studies considering, 
not only direct effects, but also indirect impacts 
of invasive species as illustrated in Fig. 2 (Settle 
and Shogren 2002, Finnof et al. 2005). By con-
sidering the indirect effects of the invasive lake 
trout in Yellowstone lake on recreational values 
and other services provided by endemic species, 
such as Yellowstone cutthroat trout, Settle and 
Shogren (2002) show that the level of mitiga-
tion measures increases as compared with when 
only direct effects are included. Similar analysis 
was carried out by Finnoff et al. (2005), but with 
an application to industry responses to zebra 
mussels in a Midwestern lake. Firms affected 
by zebra mussels, such as power plants and 
water treatment facilities, can apply control and 
adaptation measures as long as marginal benefits 
from control are higher than marginal costs. If 
the policy maker disregards the firms’ responses 
to zebra mussels, social losses occur from insuf-
ficient use of firms’ resources. Another result is 
that the policy maker can crowd out the firm’s 
control. That is, by introducing prevention and 
control, the policy maker can reduce the firm’s 
incentives to implement control and adaptation 
measures.
How close to the optimal programs (as illus-
trated in Fig. 1) are then programs implemented 
in practice? Or to put the question differently, can 
the framework for choosing targets presented in 
Fig. 1 be useful in practice when considering the 
difficulty of obtaining information and data on 
each of the three policy stages illustrated in Fig. 
2? Burnett et al. (2006) provide a good example 
on the usefulness of the framework. They show 
that actual public spending on prevention and 
control measures for two invasive species — the 
weedy shrub Miconia and the brown tree snake 
— in Hawaii can correspond to approximately 
20% of optimal spending. By implementation 
of an efficient program (as illustrated in Fig. 
1), total costs of the two invasive species could 
be reduced by approximately 90% as compared 
with those of the actual program. There are 
two reasons for this difference between actual 
and efficient public spendings. One is that the 
magnitude of the actual programme is not large 
enough to mitigate the spread of species and the 
other is the inefficient allocation of preventive 
and control measures. The latter implies that the 
measures can be reallocated and the same impact 
on the spread of invasive species can be obtained 
at a lower total cost.
Management under uncertainty
All the studies referred to earlier treat risk of spe-
cies invasion with statistical probabilities within 
an expected utility framework. This means that 
it is assumed that probabilities for different out-
comes of an alien species (Fig. 1) can be identi-
fied, and that these can be assessed in monetary 
terms. There are at least two difficulties with this 
approach. One is the lack of knowledge with 
respect to identifying outcomes and risk assess-
ments of, in particular, alien species entering a 
host region. The other difficulty is that people 
in general have difficulties in assessing low 
probabilities with detrimental effects. As noted 
by, among others, Williamson (1996), there is 
in general a low probability of establishment, 
spread and creation of damages for an intro-
duced species. However, once established and 
spread, the damages of an AIS can be high. 
Thus, there are low probabilities with potentially 
large and irreversible damages associated with 
several invasive species. However, people in 
general have a tendency to put larger probabili-
ties to detrimental events with large social losses 
(e.g. Kahneman and Tuersky 1979). This is one 
reason why expected utility frameworks applied 
in the studies mentioned earlier may not be suit-
able for identifying efficient AIS management 
strategies. Following Knight (1921), we then 
deal with uncertainty as compared with the case 
of risk when probabilities can be assessed to dif-
ferent outcomes.
The literature on uncertainty has grown 
since the identification of the Ellsberg’s paradox 
(Ellsberg 1961). The paradox revealed was that 
people, in expected utility maximizing frame-
works, make irrational choices between lotteries, 
which are explained by their aversion to uncer-
tainty when probabilities can not be assessed. In 
such situations, there is a tendency to put higher 
weights to worst possible outcomes. However, in 
spite of the specific uncertainties with respect to 
predicting impacts of an alien species, there are 
relatively few studies explicitly addressing this 
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problem (Eisworth and van Kooten 2002, Horan 
et al. 2002, Moffitt and Osteen 2006, Moffitt et 
al. 2007). What has then been suggested in this 
relatively small economics literature on man-
agement of alien species under uncertainty? In 
principle, two ways of dealing with uncertainty 
have been identified and analysed: to develop 
methods for obtaining more information or to 
rely on other decision rules than maximisation of 
expected utility.
Development of methods for improving data 
assessment was suggested by Eisworth and van 
Kooten (2002), who show how expert judge-
ments on effectiveness of different weed control 
measures can be used for assessing efficient 
management strategies. Alternative decision 
models were suggested by Horan et al. (2002), 
Moffit and Osteen, (2006) and Moffitt et al. 
(2007). The potential for alien species manage-
ment of relatively simple decision rules when 
probability distributions of different outcomes 
are not quantified, such as the minimax rule, 
where actions are taken to minimize social losses 
from the worst outcome, are discussed in Moffitt 
and Osteen (2006).
More elaborated alternative decision rules 
were analysed by Horan et al. (2002) and Mof-
fitt et al. (2007). Both studies apply pre-invasion 
control of alien species and rely on probability 
distributions of different impacts of alien species, 
but differ with respect to assumptions of manag-
er’s decision rules. Horan et al. (2002) applied 
a surprise model where the decision maker is 
assumed to be uncertainty averse, i.e. welfare 
decreases from higher uncertainty in desirable 
outcomes, which implies that events close to 
the relatively well known events get relatively 
larger weights than other events. The optimal 
policy allows for measures affecting relatively 
low probability of high damage events if they 
are regarded as possible (low potential surprise), 
which would not occur within the framework 
of a traditional risk model. In the Moffitt et al. 
(2007) model, the basic principle is that a policy 
maker searches for a decision that is robust with 
respect to as many events, or probability distri-
butions of events, as possible. It is then assumed 
that events can be characterized by probability 
distributions, but these are unknown. A robust 
optimal decision maximizes the range of prob-
ability distributions given a certain performance 
requirement, on, for example, maximum accept-
able failure probability of identifying pests. The 
optimal inspection is then determined by inspec-
tion costs and the impacts on the probability for 
which the model constraints hold.
Cost-effectiveness analysis
Since it is in practice often, but not always, dif-
ficult to measure impacts and damages from 
AIS, and to assess the impacts in monetary 
terms, it can still be useful for policy making to 
focus only on cost-effective solutions for pre-
determined targets, i.e. on the determination on 
different points on the TC curve (Fig. 1). The 
policy target can then be determined by political 
processes, and the task of economic analysis is 
to identify conditions for when this is fulfilled at 
minimum costs. The condition for a cost-effec-
tive solution is that marginal costs for achieving 
the target shall be equal for all possible meas-
ures. This includes the cost of the measures, such 
as construction of barrier zones for invasive spe-
cies, and the impact, which depends on the target 
formulation. If the target is formulated in terms 
of risk reductions of species entrance to a certain 
region, impact assessment is needed on the effect 
of barrier zones on invasive species risk.
There are a number of studies comparing 
costs and benefits of different strategies for miti-
gating damages from AIS (e.g. Anaman et al. 
1994, Bangsund et al. 1999, Cembali et al. 
2003, McConnachie et al. 2003, MacLeod et al. 
2004, Sharov 2004, Born et al. 2005), and the 
strategies are then ranked with respect to invest-
ment and maintenance cost of the measures 
and sometimes also damage costs of AIS. Such 
studies are indeed very useful, but they are not 
applying cost-effectiveness analysis since this 
requires a predetermined and common target for 
all measures, which can be expressed in physical 
or biological terms. Cost-effectiveness analysis 
then aims at identifying minimum cost solutions 
for different ambition levels with respect to AIS 
(TC curve in Fig. 1). Each point on this curve is 
obtained by calculating and comparing impacts 
on the target and costs for different prevention 
and control measures. Usually, depending on 
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the ambition level for the target setting, several 
measures are used in a cost-effective solution but 
to different degrees depending on their marginal 
costs.
There are, however, few studies carrying 
out a cost-effectiveness analysis with consid-
eration of several measures at different policy 
stages (Fig. 2) (Leung et al. 2002, Buhle et 
al. 2005). A partial cost-effectiveness analysis, 
which includes several measures at one of the 
stages shown in Fig. 2, were carried out in more 
studies, and then in particular, cost effective 
inspections for prevention of AIS introductions 
(e.g. Batabyal and Nijkamp 2005, Deangelo et 
al. 2006, Surkov et al. 2006). The cost-effective-
ness analysis in Leung et al. (2002) includes 
prevention and control measures against dam-
ages from zebra mussels in the Great Lakes. The 
result shows that the optimal payment to the firm 
for managing zebra mussels would correspond 
to one third of the actual US budget in 2001 for 
managing all invaded lakes. It is therefore quite 
likely that funding for invasive species man-
agement is underprovided in the US. Buhle et 
al. (2005) calculated cost-effective solutions for 
control of a species in different states of the spe-
cies life cycle and compare measures removing 
adults vs. egg capsules. The results depend on 
the costs for each measure, and the impact on the 
growth rate of the species.
Several studies present a partial cost-effec-
tiveness analysis mainly of different inspection 
schemes for preventing alien species entrance 
into a country (e.g. Batabyal and Nijkamp 2005, 
Deangelo et al. 2006, Surkov et al. 2006, Bata-
byal 2007). Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005) com-
pared costs between inspection strategies which 
either inspect cargos upon arrival of a certain 
number of containers or inspect cargos at fixed 
time points. They find that the first policy is 
always less costly than the second. Deangelo 
et al. (2006) compared two inspection schemes 
which differ with respect to precision and costs, 
where costs are determined as average waiting 
time for a vessel, for detecting alien species in 
cargos. Surkov et al. (2006) identified cost effec-
tive allocations of inspection among goods and 
countries where a quarantine agency minimizes 
total costs for not exceeding certain risks of 
infested ornaments imported to the Netherlands. 
In the case of a constraint of total risk, fund-
ing should be allocated among inspections of 
goods from different countries where marginal 
costs for a given risk reduction are equal, which 
constitutes the minimum cost solution. Bata-
byal (2007) arrived at similar conclusions for 
inspection of ships which should be allocated 
among vessels where marginal costs for decreas-
ing environmental damage are equal.
Policies for combating damages 
of alien species
When targets have been determined, the chosen 
package of measures remains to be implemented. 
How then to make firms and households imple-
ment low-cost measures against damages from 
alien species so the target(s) is achieved? When 
designing appropriate policy instrument(s) addi-
tional costs occur for implementing and enforc-
ing the chosen instruments, so called transaction 
costs, which implies that the costs for achieving 
different AIS reduction targets (TC curve in Fig. 
1) increase. Furthermore, not all instruments will 
generate the minimum cost solutions for choices 
of measures, which generate further increases 
in the total costs. This has been recognised in 
the literature on environmental policy instru-
ments for decades, and this chapter starts with 
a brief presentation of these experiences. Since 
relatively many studies on policies for combating 
invasive alien species are focused on preventing 
the introduction of AIS by means of tariffs on 
imports, which is an important vector for AIS, 
they are presented separately.
Choice of policy instruments
Introduction of aliens by trade can be counter-
acted by port inspections and quarantine require-
ments of imported potential AIS, by affecting 
demand for goods having a high risk of carrying 
AIS by, for example, labelling, and by importing 
goods from relatively risk-free regions. Other 
mechanisms are implementation of policy instru-
ments, such as charges on imports of potential 
AIS or compensation payments for building bar-
rier zones. Starting in the early 1930s, the lit-
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erature on the design of environmental policies 
has developed rapidly (see Helfand et al. 2002, 
for a review). One prerequisite for a well-func-
tioning policy, in addition to understanding the 
causes and damages of alien species, is to iden-
tify which criteria the policy instruments are 
supposed to achieve. Common criteria used for 
policy analyses are:
— cost effectiveness and technological devel-
opment, which means that the instruments 
should generate determined target(s) at mini-
mum cost in the short and long run by stimu-
lating technological development,
— equity and fairness, implying that agreements 
should result in equal relative cost burdens 
among the partners and adopt the polluter 
pay principle,
— precision and flexibility, the instrument 
should result in actions as close to the target 
as possible, but at the same time be flexible 
enough to give the opportunity of changing 
targets if found necessary in an environmen-
tal perspective, i.e. adaptive management,
— enforcement and transaction costs should be 
as low as possible, which include, among 
others, costs of administrating the instrument 
and enforcing compliance.
Is there any instrument that is best with respect 
to all these criteria? Unfortunately not, but there 
are candidates that perform relatively well with 
respect to several of the criteria. The choice is 
then in principle between four types of policies: 
command and control, economic instruments, 
markets for trading, and information (Table 1).
The command and control policy, which has 
been much used in practice, implies that a regu-
lator decides which measures, such as technol-
ogy standards for ballast cleaning or bans on 
imports of certain exotic species, to implement. 
Another example of a command and control 
policy is the widely applied system of requiring 
authority-approved permits for introducing spe-
cies. The command and control policy usually 
generates a certain target at relatively high costs 
since it gives no room for cost adjustment at 
the firm level. On the other hand, given that all 
firms comply with the regulation, the precision 
is high.
Economic instruments create incentives 
either to reduce alien spreading activities, such 
as import charges, or to make it beneficial to 
adopt cleaning activities, such as subsidies for 
ballast cleaning. Charge instruments rely on the 
polluter pay principle, and are also cost-effective 
since firms have the possibility to adjust their 
activities according to their prevention or control 
costs. Furthermore, since it is costly to contribute 
to the spreading of alien species, incentives exist 
for finding new prevention, control or damage 
reduction technologies. However, the precision 
is relatively low since it is difficult to predict 
the final outcome from firms’ adjustments to the 
instrument. On the other hand, there is a great 
degree of flexibility since it is in principle rela-
tively easy to change the charge level, increasing 
it if the final spreads are too high and vice versa. 
A disadvantage is that firms’ relatively high con-
trol costs create incentives for evading charge 
payments, which in turn implies higher transac-
tion costs than for other instruments. Another 
Table 1. classes of policy instruments and their relative advantages.
Policy instrument relative advantages
economic instruments, such as charges on imports cost-effectiveness, flexibility, technological
and subsidies on control development, fairness
command and control instruments, such as Precision, equity
bans on imports of alien species and quarantine requirements
markets for trading, such as trading in duties for  Precision, cost-effectiveness, flexibility, fairness
ballast cleaning rights for imports of alien species
information, such as campaigns on effects of alien species technological development, enforcement
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problem associated with liability rules, where 
firms pay for the damage they create, is to show 
who is responsible for the damage.
The third option — trading market in, for 
example, risk of species spread — is a combina-
tion of command and control policy and eco-
nomic instruments where, for example, a maxi-
mum spreading probability is set for a specific 
region and quotas are distributed to all affected 
firms. The difference as compared with a com-
mand and control policy is that these quotas, or 
permits, can be traded between the firms. This 
means that firms with high control costs purchase 
permits and low costs firms sell if the offered 
price exceeds the corresponding control cost. 
Thus, cost-effectiveness is achieved through the 
allocation of control towards low-costs firms. In 
principle then, the trading market has all the rela-
tive advantages attributed to both the command 
and control and economic instrument systems.
The fourth possibility, dissemination of 
information on, for example, the risk of spread 
and damages associated with ornamental exotic 
plants, appeals to people’s concern for the envi-
ronment. As such, transaction costs are likely 
to be low. Another type of information is on 
methods for controlling and eradicating species, 
which may promote technological development. 
A disadvantage is that the instrument is likely 
not to result in sufficient mitigation activities 
in cases where large efforts with high costs are 
required.
Trade and tariff policies
Trade within and between countries is regarded 
as the main vector of invasive species, and 
regulating this has the potential for reducing risk 
of species introductions (e.g. Perrings 2000). 
Despite this insight, there are surprisingly few 
empirical studies identifying the role of differ-
ent factors for introduction and spread of alien 
species (Dalmazzone 2000, Vilà and Pujadas 
2001). Dalmazzone (2000) made a statistical test 
explaining occurrences of alien species in 26 
countries by testing two interlinked hypotheses: 
alien species depend on the openness and/or 
on the activity of a country. Openness is meas-
ured as trade related to total income or gross 
domestic product (GDP) in an economy, activity 
level measured as GDP/capita, managed land, 
and population density. Openness gives rise to 
imports of alien species and activity may create 
disturbed spatial areas, making them suscepti-
ble to alien species. Using the fraction of alien 
species to native species as a dependent vari-
able, the results indicate that population density, 
GDP/capita, and managed land have a significant 
impact on the relative occurrence of alien spe-
cies. Interestingly, trade volume shows no sig-
nificant effect, but instead the duty levels on the 
imported goods, indicating that it is not the trade 
volume as such that affects spread of species, 
but instead the composition of trade products 
and countries of origin. Vilà and Pujadas (2001) 
contrasted the results of Dalmazzone (2000) by 
reporting a positive correlation between imports 
and frequency of alien species in 28 European 
and North African countries. In addition, the 
United Nation’s index of human development, 
which includes education and life expectancy, 
shows a positive impact on alien species occur-
rences. However, both studies are made with 
relatively small samples and the results should 
therefore be interpreted with much caution.
In contrast to empirical studies of causes of 
AIS occurrences, there are, within the economics 
literature on invasive species, relatively many 
studies on trade-related policies, mainly on eco-
nomic instrument such as tariffs on imports (e.g. 
Costello and McAusland 2003, McAusland and 
Costello 2004, Knowler and Barbier 2005, Mar-
golis et al. 2005, Tu et al. 2005, Tu and Beghin 
2006). A majority of these studies are focused on 
efficient design of tariffs (Costello and McAus-
land 2003, McAusland and Costello 2004, Bar-
bier and Knowler 2005, Margolis et al. 2005). 
Another aspect on trade and AIS is provided by 
considering the side effects of agro-forestry poli-
cies in term of increases in AIS risks (Tu et al. 
2005, Tu and Beghin 2006).
The general principle for efficient design 
of the tariff level on imported goods is that it 
shall reflect the damage of associated marginal 
decrease in the risk of AIS introduction not 
accounted for in the markets for the goods. How-
ever, introduction of tariffs gives rise to adjust-
ments in production and consumption in the 
host country which may counteract the effects 
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of the tariffs on the risk of species introduc-
tion (Costello and McAusland 2003, McAusland 
and Costello 2004). Costello and McAusland 
(2003) showed, by means of a simple partial 
equilibrium model of trade for a small country, 
that decreased imports of, for example, agri-
cultural primary products as a result of a tariff 
introduction also lead to more domestic produc-
tion, which in turn raises susceptibility for spe-
cies invasion by increases in areas of disturbed 
land. McAusland and Costello (2004) arrived at 
similar conclusions but from another perspec-
tive. They compare tariffs with a command and 
control type policy, namely port inspection poli-
cies for combating introduction of trade-related 
invasive species, and show that it can be optimal 
for a host country to increase its inspection 
and decrease the tariff in order to counteract 
higher domestic prices, and thereby reductions 
in consumer welfare and changes in land use, on 
rejected import goods. When there are several 
trading partners, the importing country can set an 
optimal policy based on differences in infection 
rates between the countries, which would also 
promote technological development of clean-
ing measures at the firm level. However, such a 
discriminatory policy among countries may be 
difficult to implement in practice due to current 
WTO (World Trade Organization) regulations 
(see e.g. Perrings et al. 2005)
There may be other reasons for undesirable 
results from tariffs on imported goods than econ-
omy wide adjustments (Knowler and Barbier 
2005, Margolis et al. 2005). Knowler and Bar-
bier (2005) showed that firms’ responses to a tax 
on detected exotic plants may increase the risk of 
invasion. The reason is that industry managers 
want to speed up the establishment of nurseries 
in order to exploit profits before detected inva-
sion, which implies increase in risk of damage 
during time. They also show that a command 
and control policy, bans of trade, is more costly 
than a tax policy. Margolis et al. (2005) focused 
on the role of lobbying by interest groups, which 
is common in practice, for tariff design. If pri-
vate lobbying groups can affect governmental 
behaviour by donations to, for example, election 
campaigns, they may influence the level of the 
tariff to their advantages. Trade distorting tariffs 
may then exist when governments put relatively 
high weights to private interests, which, in turn, 
may have a positive impact by reducing the risk 
of species invasion from trade. This occurs when 
tariffs are raised on goods with relatively high 
invasion risk.
However, trade and trade policies affect risk 
invasion, not only directly through imports of 
goods with high infestation rates, but also indi-
rectly through changes in the trade structure (Tu 
et al. 2005, Tu and Beghin 2006). Tu et al. (2005) 
looked at the interaction between tariff escalation 
on agro-forestry markets, which occurs in devel-
oped and developing countries, and invasive 
risk. By means of a simple model of a small open 
economy, they show that the tariff escalation in 
agro-forestry products leads to increased risk for 
species of invasion in developed countries due to 
the direction in trade towards primary products 
and decreases in imports of processed goods. 
The increased risk of invasion can be avoided by 
lowering tariffs on processed goods. A second 
benefit then arises from reductions in trade dis-
tortions. An expansion on this theme is made by 
Tu and Beghin et al. (2006) by accounting for 
trades between countries and multilateral trade. 
They showed that the risk for AIS invasion is 
likely to increase due to higher domestic produc-
tion caused by expansion of the export markets. 
Trade in general makes use of countries’ relative 
advantages which expand export markets and 
increase the total production from all countries, 
which results in higher risk of AIS from both 
increased trade and from larger domestic produc-
tion.
Non-trade policies
In spite of the difficulties provided by WTO for 
introducing tariff policies for single countries, 
there are few studies analysing policies that 
are not related to international trade of goods 
and services (Thomas and Randall 2000, Settle 
and Shogren 2002, Jetter et al. 2003, Finnoff 
et al. 2005, Horan and Lupi 2005, Roti Jones 
and Corona 2008). One obvious question is if 
policies should be implemented for controlling 
spread or damage of the species. A majority of 
the studies raising this issue suggests alternative 
policies for controlling invasive species; com-
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pensation payments for control measures, trading 
market system and charges on ballast water for 
vessels (Jetter 2003, Horan and Lupi 2005, Roti 
Jones and Corona 2008). One study investigates 
policies directed towards damage reduction by 
liability rules (Thomas and Randall 2000).
Both systems of compensation payments for 
implementation of measures and payments for 
AIS spread and damage create incentives for 
firm to undertake actions. One main difference 
between the two types of systems is the relatively 
ease of identifying firms implementing measures 
as compared to those responsible for AIS spread 
and damage. This was considered by Jetter et al. 
(2003) who suggested a compensation system for 
control programmes of yellow starthistle. They 
found that farmers had no incentives to invest 
in control programmes since associated costs 
exceed benefits from improved land productiv-
ity, and a compensation payment was therefore 
needed to encourage the farmers to reduce the 
risk of spread of the weed.
Charges, permit market system and liability 
rules aim at reducing AIS spread and damage by 
requiring payments from the responsible actors. 
One difficulty with this approach is to relate a 
certain firm, or a vessel, to spread or damage 
of AIS. This is likely to imply the existence of 
asymmetric information among involved policy 
makers and firms or households. For example, 
firms know more about their costs for measures, 
and policy makers may have specific biological 
expert knowledge. The existence of such asym-
metric information implies that it becomes more 
difficult to determine the charge or compensation 
rates, and firms can under such conditions make 
use of their greater knowledge to their advan-
tage, resulting in less native species protection. 
This problem has been recognized by Randall 
and Thomas (2000), Horan and Lupi (2005), and 
Roti Jones and Corona (2008) when designing 
their three different systems; damage liability 
rules, market for risk trading, and charges on 
risk.
A damage liability scheme is suggested by 
Thomas and Randall (2000), where a firm is 
required to post an ex ante assurance bond in 
order to avoid large social losses from species 
release which the firm can not pay ex post. The 
authors show that if the policy maker imposes 
a payment requirement that corresponds to the 
largest possible environmental damage, efficient 
outcomes can occur. Instead of damage control, 
i.e. stage three in Fig. 2, Horan and Lupi (2005), 
and Roti Jones and Corona (2008) focused on 
control of AIS spread as illustrated by the second 
stage in Fig. 2. Both studies also applied the 
instruments to risks of AIS spread by vessels.
A system for trading in risks of AIS on a 
market was suggested in Horan and Lupi (2005) 
where vessels operating, for example, the Great 
Lakes trade in their probabilities of invasions 
(which is most close to associated environmen-
tal damage) on a one-to-one basis. The sug-
gested system is applied to trading in risks for 
introduction of Ponto-Caspian species in the 
Great Lakes. Four different policies for ballast 
cleaning are then compared with the least costly 
solution: trading (on a one-to-one basis), and 
uniform requirements on either filtering, heat or 
ballast exchange. For a given risk target, trad-
ing is always less costly than the other systems 
since it allows for firms to choose the least costly 
option. Roti Jonas and Corona (2007) suggested 
another economic instrument; a charge based 
on changes in total AIS population in a port. In 
doing this they draw on the experiences from 
the so-called non-point source literature, which 
is characterized by the difficulty of assessing 
environmental impacts from pollution of each 
emission source, such as determining nutrients 
leaching into a lake from each surrounding farm. 
As suggested by Segerson (1988), an efficient 
outcome can occur if charges on pollution are 
determined by the environmental impacts from 
a marginal change in total pollutant load to, 
for example, a water recipient. Roti Jones and 
Corona (2008) translated Segerson’s result into 
a uniform charge for changes in the total amount 
of AIS in a port. As the authors correctly note, 
this mechanism requires the quantification of 
changes in invasive species, which can be dif-
ficult to obtain in practice.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to present eco-
nomic analysis and studies on management of 
invasive species. Two management issues were 
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then raised: how to set targets and how to find 
the best policy instruments to achieve the targets. 
Typical for economic approaches is to find the 
targets that make the best use of society’s total 
resources. This implies the creation of as much 
social surplus as possible from target setting or, 
if the damage cost of AIS can not be estimated, 
achievement of predetermined targets at mini-
mum costs. A three-stage policy intervention 
scale — prevention and control of spread and 
damage — was used as a framework for analysis 
of the two management questions.
Ideally, in setting targets, all three policy 
levels and associated measures are included 
when determining social net surplus. For each 
measure, such as port inspections, creation of 
barrier zones, or removal of mussels, costs and 
damage reductions are calculated. This implies 
the need for recognizing the uncertainty and risk 
associated with each of the AIS entrance steps 
into a new region — introduction, establishment, 
spread, and damage creation — together with 
the time delays between the implementation of 
measures and associated impact on damage. This 
was made in a few theoretical studies where 
distinctions are usually made between mitigation 
(prevention and control) and adaptation (damage 
control or adaptation) measures (e.g. Perrings 
2005, Finnoff et al. 2005). A relative advantage 
of adaptation is that resources are focused on 
reducing real damage, while effects of combat-
ing all species spread are more uncertain since 
not all invasive species create environmental 
damage. On the other hand, it is usually difficult 
to control damage from a species once it has 
been established, which calls for early control 
or eradication efforts. Other studies point at the 
importance of timing of measures since the ben-
efits of prevention and control measures depend 
on the avoided growth rate of the AIS, and also 
on the need for considering the feedback mecha-
nisms between society and the biological sys-
tems (e.g. Olsson and Roy 2002, Finnoff et al. 
2005). Public policy without this consideration 
of feedback between the systems may counteract 
private incentives for combating AIS risks.
Most of the studies aimed at identifying effi-
cient policies for achieving predetermined tar-
gets analyse the potential of tariffs on trade and 
compare this with inspection of imports, which is 
much used in practice (Costello and McAusland 
2003, McAusland and Costello 2004, Knowler 
and Barbier 2005, Margolis 2005, Tu et al. 2005, 
Tu and Beghin 2006, Batabyal 2007). Another 
common feature of the studies is that they com-
pare policies with respect to efficiency, i.e. which 
policy generates the largest social net surplus. 
An important result from these studies is that a 
tariff on imports may have counteractive effects 
and may, in fact, result in higher risk for AIS. 
This result emerges from the recognition that 
AIS establishment and damage depend not only 
on trade volume but also on habitat characteris-
tics in the host country. A tariff reduces imported 
goods and thereby the infestation rate, but can 
also increase domestic production of the goods 
in question, which, in turn, can increase the area 
of disturbed land and make the country more 
susceptible to invasion. Inspection policy has 
the advantage of not raising prices of all imports, 
but only on the goods rejected. In order to avoid 
negative side effects from eventual increase of 
domestic production of rejected imported goods, 
a tariff reduction could be optimal. This result 
points at the need for designing the two policies 
simultaneously, but also addressing the difficulty 
associated with different public bodies having 
discretion for their implementation.
In spite of the difficulties of introducing tar-
iffs on trade in practice due to the WTO regula-
tions on equal treatment of foreign and domestic 
goods, there are relatively few studies comparing 
different policies for national control of spread 
and damage of AIS (Thomas and Randall 2000, 
Jetter et al. 2003, Horan and Lupi 2005, Roti 
Jones and Corona 2008). A common result from 
this literature is that economic instruments are 
preferred to command and control policies due 
to the cost effectiveness property. One such 
innovative policy is a market for trading in 
risk suggested by Horan and Lupi (2005), who 
showed that the system achieves a certain proba-
bilistic risk target at considerably lower cost than 
technology requirement, which is often used 
in practices such as ballast cleaning require-
ment. However, none of the studies analyse 
or calculate transaction cost of different policy 
instruments, which can be significant. For exam-
ple, transaction costs of a wildlife enhancement 
schemes in UK correspond to approximately 110 
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per cent of the management cost (Falconer and 
Saunders 2002).
Although this review has not been exhaustive 
with respect to inclusion of economic studies of 
alien species, it reveals that the number of studies 
is small as compared with that in other fields of 
environmental concern, such as climate change, 
biodiversity and water pollution (e.g. Perrings et 
al. 2000). In spite of this, there has been a recent 
and rapid development of applications of up-to-
date theoretical methods on AIS management, 
which have resulted in important insights for 
target setting and policy design. However, policy 
instruments are compared mainly with respect 
to cost-effectiveness, and not according to other 
criteria such as certainty in achieving the targets, 
equity when all firms are subjected to the same 
requirement or inspection, and transaction cost. 
Since these criteria may justify the commonly 
used command and control policy in practice, 
there might be a bias in the results in favour of 
market-based instruments.
Analyses of the potential of international 
agreements are also lacking, but can be very 
fruitful when considering the role of interna-
tional trade for spread of AIS (see e.g. Stoett 
2007, for a discussion on the potential of interna-
tional agreements). Furthermore, there is a lack 
of empirical case studies where the achieved 
theoretical insights have been tested or where 
actual policies have been evaluated and com-
pared with respect to several criteria. The few 
studies that exist are mainly applied to US con-
ditions (e.g. Horan and Lupi 2005, Saphores 
and Shogren 2005). One important reason for 
the lack of empirical studies is the specific dif-
ficulty of obtaining data of sufficient quality 
on the environmental impacts of potential AIS. 
This, in combination with the relatively recent 
concern and policies against AIS, can explain 
why the economics of alien invasive species is 
in a relatively early state of research, where sev-
eral empirical challenges need to be addressed. 
These involve quantification of direct and indi-
rect impacts of specific species, quantification of 
impacts of different measures on spread of AIS, 
improved understanding of the causes for spread 
of AIS, cost effectiveness analysis of several 
different prevention and control measures, and 
better knowledge of the potential of international 
agreements for combating AIS and of function-
ing of regulations in practice.
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